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[2207.01761] First Price Auction is $1 - 1/e^2$ Efficient
source link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.01761
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Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory
[Submitted on 5 Jul 2022]
First Price Auction is 1 - 1/e^2 Efficient
We prove that the {\sf PoA} of {\sf First Price Auctions} is 1 - 1/e^2 \approx 0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430,\, 0.8689].
| Comments: | To appear in FOCS 2022 |
| Subjects: | Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2207.01761 [cs.GT] |
| (or arXiv:2207.01761v1 [cs.GT] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2207.01761 |
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