从零开始的 Boa 框架 Fuzz

18小时之前2023年01月31日二进制安全

作者：崎山松形
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最近在搞Iot的时候接触到Qiling框架，用了一段时间后感觉确实模拟功能挺强大的，还支持Fuzz，于是开始学习对Iot webserver这样的程序进行Fuzz。

官方给出了类似的例子如Tenda AC15 的httpd的fuzz脚本，但是也就光秃秃一个脚本还是需要自己来一遍才能学到一些东西；因为面向的是Iot webserver的Fuzz因此需要对嵌入式设备中常用web开源框架有一些了解，这里是对于Boa框架的fuzz案例。

环境准备：

• qiling-dev branch：这里并没有选择直接pip安装，方便修改源码

• AFL++：在python中可以import unicornafl就行

    git clone https://github.com/AFLplusplus/AFLplusplus.git
    make -C AFLplusplus
    cd AFLplusplus/unicorn_mode ; ./build_unicorn_support.sh

• 一个坑是最好获取版本高于3.15的cmake要不然编译的时候有些cmake参数识别有问题，我遇到的就是:cmake -S unicorn/ -B unicorn/build -D BUILD_SHARED_LIBS=no问题

• 需要对Qiling，AFL有些了解

Fuzz思路：

Iot设备就连环境模拟都比较棘手就就更别说Fuzz了，但是Qiling提供的进程快照(snapshot)功能给了我们一个不错的思路，这也是Qiling官方Fuzz案例的一个思路：即对某函数部分Fuzz(Partial Fuzz)

Tenda-AC15

Qiling使用4个脚本来实现对该款路由器上httpd程序的Fuzz

首先是saver_tendaac15_httpd.py用于保存fuzz的起始状态快照，主要代码如下：

def save_context(ql, *args, **kw):
    ql.save(cpu_context=False, snapshot="snapshot.bin")

def check_pc(ql):
    print("=" * 50)
    print("Hit fuzz point, stop at PC = 0x%x" % ql.arch.regs.arch_pc)
    print("=" * 50)
    ql.emu_stop()


def my_sandbox(path, rootfs):
    ql = Qiling(path, rootfs, verbose=QL_VERBOSE.DEBUG)
    ql.add_fs_mapper("/dev/urandom","/dev/urandom")
    ql.hook_address(save_context, 0x10930)        #<=======
    ql.hook_address(patcher, ql.loader.elf_entry)
    ql.hook_address(check_pc, 0x7a0cc)            #<=======
    ql.run()

ql.hook_address(save_context, 0x10930)：表示当程序跑到0x10930地址时调用save_context函数将保存此刻模拟状态

但需要输入来触发程序按照预想的跑到0x10930位置，带上面脚本跑起来后使用addressNat_overflow.sh触发

#!/bin/sh

curl -v -H "X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest" -b "password=1234" -e http://localhost:8080/samba.html -H "Content-Type:application/x-www-form-urlencoded" --data "entrys=sync" --data "page=CCCCAAAA" http://localhost:8080/goform/addressNat

那么我们就获得了模拟进程快照snapshot.bin之后fuzz就重复利用该文件启动就行，对应fuzz_tendaac15_httpd.py

def main(input_file, enable_trace=False):
    ql = Qiling(["rootfs/bin/httpd"], "rootfs", verbose=QL_VERBOSE.DEBUG, console = True if enable_trace else False)

    # save current emulated status
    ql.restore(snapshot="snapshot.bin")

    # return should be 0x7ff3ca64
    fuzz_mem=ql.mem.search(b"CCCCAAAA")
    target_address = fuzz_mem[0]

    def place_input_callback(_ql: Qiling, input: bytes, _):
        _ql.mem.write(target_address, input)

    def start_afl(_ql: Qiling):
        """
        Callback from inside
        """
        ql_afl_fuzz(_ql, input_file=input_file, place_input_callback=place_input_callback, exits=[ql.os.exit_point])

    ql.hook_address(callback=start_afl, address=0x10930+8)

    try:
        ql.run(begin = 0x10930+4, end = 0x7a0cc+4)
        os._exit(0)
    except:
        if enable_trace:
            print("\nFuzzer Went Shit")
        os._exit(0)        

if __name__ == "__main__":
    if len(sys.argv) == 1:
        raise ValueError("No input file provided.")

    if len(sys.argv) > 2 and sys.argv[1] == "-t":
        main(sys.argv[2], enable_trace=True)
    else:
        main(sys.argv[1])

• 恢复快照：ql.restore(snapshot="snapshot.bin")

• 变异数据缓存定位：fuzz_mem=ql.mem.search(b"CCCCAAAA")

• 以hook方式从起始地址附近的开始fuzz：ql.hook_address(callback=start_afl, address=0x10930+8)

最后开始Fuzz

#!/usr/bin/sh

AFL_DEBUG_CHILD_OUTPUT=1 AFL_AUTORESUME=1 AFL_PATH="$(realpath ./AFLplusplus)" PATH="$AFL_PATH:$PATH" ./AFLplusplus/afl-fuzz -i afl_inputs -o afl_outputs -U -- python3 ./fuzz_tendaac15_httpd.py @@

说实话这样连最关键的fuzz范围0x10930，0x7a0cc怎么来的都不知道当时逆向定位这两个地址也是一头雾水毫无特征，还是得自己实操

因此选定了Boa框架(之前了解过源码)从零开始对其进行Fuzz

Boa Fuzz

选择一个网上有许多漏洞分析的设备：vivetok 摄像头，固件链接；而且webservre为Boa框架

echo -en "POST /cgi-bin/admin/upgrade.cgi HTTP/1.0\nContent-Length:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGGGGHHHHIIIIXXXX\n\r\n\r\n"  | ncat -v 192.168.57.20 80

Boa框架：

主要处理逻辑在process_requests函数中：

           /*获取就绪队列并处理*/
    current = request_ready;

    while (current) {
        time(&current_time);
        if (current->buffer_end && /* there is data in the buffer */
            current->status != DEAD && current->status != DONE) {
            retval = req_flush(current);
            /*
             * retval can be -2=error, -1=blocked, or bytes left
             */
            if (retval == -2) { /* error */
                current->status = DEAD;
                retval = 0;
            } else if (retval >= 0) {
                /* notice the >= which is different from below?
                   Here, we may just be flushing headers.
                   We don't want to return 0 because we are not DONE
                   or DEAD */

                retval = 1;
            }
        } else {/*主要处理请求部分在这里*/
            switch (current->status) {
            case READ_HEADER:
            case ONE_CR:
            case ONE_LF:
            case TWO_CR:
                retval = read_header(current);    //解析request头部，该函数类似与FILE_IO
                break;                            //函数request内部有8192+1字节的buffer，data的头尾指针等，最终调用
            case BODY_READ:                       //bytes = read(req->fd, buffer + req->client_stream_pos, buf_bytes_left);读取
                retval = read_body(current);
                break;
            case BODY_WRITE:
                retval = write_body(current);
                break;
            case WRITE:
                retval = process_get(current);
                break;
            case PIPE_READ:
                retval = read_from_pipe(current);
                break;
            case PIPE_WRITE:
                retval = write_from_pipe(current);
                break;
            case DONE:
                /* a non-status that will terminate the request */
                retval = req_flush(current);
                /*
                 * retval can be -2=error, -1=blocked, or bytes left
                 */
                if (retval == -2) { /* error */
                    current->status = DEAD;
                    retval = 0;
                } else if (retval > 0) {
                    retval = 1;
                }
                break;
            case DEAD:
                retval = 0;
                current->buffer_end = 0;
                SQUASH_KA(current);
                break;
            default:
                retval = 0;
                fprintf(stderr, "Unknown status (%d), "
                        "closing!\n", current->status);
                current->status = DEAD;
                break;
            }
        }

主要看中间的Switch case：

• read_header：解析request头部，该函数类似FILE_IO函数
• request内部有8192+1字节的buffer，data的头尾指针等，最终调用bytes = read(req->fd, buffer + req->client_stream_pos, buf_bytes_left);读取client发送的请求
• 会提取并解析头部信息
• 对于GET传参，主要使用read_header, read_from_pipe, write_from_pipe完成cgi的调用
• 对于POST传参，主要调用read_header, read_body, write_body完成cgi调用

就拿read_header函数来说，厂商应该会在里面增加一些url过虑以及响应处理，在这个摄像头中漏洞也确实出在这个函数：

没有对Content-Length成员做限制；根据源码中提示字符串Unknown status (%d), closing可以轻松定位到这几个函数:

那么接下来就尝试利用Qiling 启动这个程序并且Partial Fuzz函数"read_header"

模拟启动的宗旨(我的)是遇到啥错误修最后一个报错点

启动模板：

import os, sys
sys.path.append('/home/iot/workspace/Emulator/qiling-dev')
from qiling import Qiling
from qiling.const import QL_INTERCEPT, QL_VERBOSE


def boa_run(path: list, rootfs: str, profile: str = 'default'):
    ql = Qiling(path, rootfs, profile=profile, verbose=QL_VERBOSE.OFF, multithread=False)
    """setup files"""
    ql.add_fs_mapper('/dev/null', '/dev/null')

    """hooks"""

    ql.run()


if __name__ == '__main__':
    os.chdir('/home/iot/workspace/Emulator/qiling-dev/vivetok')
    path = ['./rootfs/usr/sbin/httpd', "-c", "/etc/conf.d/boa", "-d"]
    rootfs = './rootfs'
    profile = './boa_arm.ql'
    boa_run(path=path, rootfs=rootfs, profile=profile)

---

尝试启动

首先遇到的是：gethostbyname:: Success

在IDA中定位到：

函数原型：

struct hostent *gethostbyname(const char *hostname);
struct hostent{
    char *h_name;  //official name
    char **h_aliases;  //alias list
    int  h_addrtype;  //host address type
    int  h_length;  //address lenght
    char **h_addr_list;  //address list
}

获取返回的结构体还挺复杂的，问题的原因是 在调用gethostname将获得ql_vm作为主机名所以当以此调用gethostbyname无法获得主机信息，所以hook这个函数，并提前开辟空间存放伪造信息：

"""
struct hostent{
    char *h_name;  //official name
    char **h_aliases;  //alias list
    int  h_addrtype;  //host address type
    int  h_length;  //address lenght
    char **h_addr_list;  //address list
}
"""
def hook_memSpace(ql: Qiling):
    ql.mem.map(0x1000, 0x1000, info='my_hook')
    data = struct.pack('<IIIII', 0x1100, 0x1100, AF_INET, 4, 0x1100)
    ql.mem.write(0x1000, data)
    ql.mem.write(0x1100, b'qiling')

def lib_gethostbyname(ql: Qiling):
    args = ql.os.resolve_fcall_params({'name':STRING})
    print('[gethostbyname]: ' + args['name'])
    ql.arch.regs.write('r0', 0x1000)

还有一个严重问题就是模拟过程中程序自动采用ipv6协议，这就很烦因为qiling的ipv6协议支持的不是很好

ipv6 socket

AttributeError: 'sockaddr_in' object has no attribute 'sin6_addr'

问题处在对ipv6的系统调用bind：

elif sa_family == AF_INET6 and ql.os.ipv6:
    sockaddr_in6 = make_sockaddr_in(abits, endian)
    sockaddr_obj = sockaddr_in6.from_buffer(data)

    port = ntohs(ql, sockaddr_obj.sin_port)
    host = inet6_ntoa(sockaddr_obj.sin6_addr.s6_addr)

    if ql.os.bindtolocalhost:
        host = '::1'

    if not ql.os.root and port <= 1024:
        port = port + 8000

def make_sockaddr_in(archbits: int, endian: QL_ENDIAN):
    Struct = struct.get_aligned_struct(archbits, endian)

    class in_addr(Struct):
        _fields_ = (
            ('s_addr', ctypes.c_uint32),
        )

    class sockaddr_in(Struct):
        _fields_ = (
            ('sin_family', ctypes.c_int16),
            ('sin_port',   ctypes.c_uint16),
            ('sin_addr',   in_addr),
            ('sin_zero',   ctypes.c_byte * 8)
        )

    return sockaddr_in

def make_sockaddr_in6(archbits: int, endian: QL_ENDIAN):
    Struct = struct.get_aligned_struct(archbits, endian)

    class in6_addr(Struct):
        _fields_ = (
            ('s6_addr', ctypes.c_uint8 * 16),
        )

    class sockaddr_in6(Struct):
        _fields_ = (
            ('sin6_family',   ctypes.c_int16),
            ('sin6_port',     ctypes.c_uint16),
            ('sin6_flowinfo', ctypes.c_uint32),
            ('sin6_addr',     in6_addr),
            ('sin6_scope_id', ctypes.c_uint32)
        )

    return sockaddr_in6

make_sockaddr_in, make_sockaddr_in6基于ctypes构造严格的sockaddr结构体，因为是ipv6所以得用make_sockaddr_in6

还有就是函数(function) inet6_ntoa: (addr: bytes) -> str需要bytes对象而sockaddr_obj.sin6_addr.s6_addr是cbytes类型所以得bytes转

sockaddr_in6 = make_sockaddr_in6(abits, endian)
sockaddr_obj = sockaddr_in6.from_buffer(data)
port = ntohs(ql, sockaddr_obj.sin6_port)
host = inet6_ntoa(bytes(sockaddr_obj.sin6_addr.s6_addr))

OSError: [Errno 98] Address already in use

还是在调用bind时候，因为qiling会对低于1024的端口bind进行修改：

if not ql.os.root and port <= 1024:
        port = port + 8000

而后面还对8080端口进行一次bind，所以这里得改，然后其实就能进入核心处理逻辑了 ：

当然还得看看链接有没有问题：尝试访问又出现问题

$ echo -en "GET /index.html HTTP/1.0\n\rContent-Length:20\n\r\n\r"  | nc -v ::1 9080
Connection to ::1 9080 port [tcp/*] succeeded!

File "/home/iot/workspace/Emulator/qiling-dev-stb/qiling/os/posix/syscall/socket.py", line 669, in ql_syscall_accept
    host, port = address
ValueError: too many values to unpack (expected 2)

ValueError: too many values to unpack (expected 2)

经调试原来在python中accept ipv6的连接后会返回一个长度为4的元组的address：

同样的问题还发生在ql_syscall_getsockname：sockname = sock.getsockname()

TypeError: expected c_ubyte_Array_16 instance, got int

[x]     Syscall ERROR: ql_syscall_accept DEBUG: expected c_ubyte_Array_16 instance, got int
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/home/iot/workspace/Emulator/qiling-dev-stb/qiling/os/posix/posix.py", line 280, in load_syscall
    retval = syscall_hook(self.ql, *params)
  File "/home/iot/workspace/Emulator/qiling-dev-stb/qiling/os/posix/syscall/socket.py", line 674, in ql_syscall_accept
    obj.sin6_addr.s6_addr = inet6_aton(str(host))
TypeError: expected c_ubyte_Array_16 instance, got int

解决：bytes转cbyts类

obj.sin6_addr.s6_addr = (ctypes.c_ubyte * 16).from_buffer_copy(inet6_aton(str(host)).to_bytes(16, 'big'))

主要问题就这些(修了挺久的)，然后就可以对一些函数进行fuzz了

Fuzz Partial

确定Fuzz范围，这个范围主要是给到ql_afl_fuzz函数，这里是打算Fuzz read_header函数(sub_17F80)，那么从数据入口下手：

读取POST或者GET方法的http包那么肯定要解析处理的，处理完成返回一个状态(源码中retval)来指示下一步处理，找到退出点：

因此要从0x180F8附近开始Fuzz，然后0x18398表示函数正常退出将执行下一轮fuzz

脚本模板：

import os, sys
sys.path.append('/home/iot/workspace/Emulator/qiling-dev')
from qiling.const import QL_INTERCEPT, QL_VERBOSE
from qiling import Qiling

from qiling.extensions.afl import ql_afl_fuzz


def main(input_file: str, trace: bool = False):
    ql = Qiling(['./rootfs/usr/sbin/httpd', "-c", "/etc/conf.d/boa", "-d"], rootfs='./rootfs', profile='./boa_arm.ql', verbose=QL_VERBOSE.OFF, console = True if trace else False)
    ql.restore(snapshot='./context.bin')

    def place_input_callback(_ql: Qiling, input: bytes, _):
        # print(b"**************** " + input)
        _ql.mem.write(target_addr, input)

    def start_afl(_ql: Qiling):
        """
        Callback from inside
        """
        ql_afl_fuzz(_ql, input_file=input_file, place_input_callback=place_input_callback, exits=[0x018398])

    ql.hook_address(callback=start_afl, address=0x180F8)

    try:
        # ql.debugger = True
        ql.run(begin=0x180F8)
        os._exit(0)
    except:
        if trace:
            print("\nFuzzer Went Shit")
        os._exit(0)  

if __name__ == "__main__":
    if len(sys.argv) == 1:
        raise ValueError("No input file provided.")

    os.chdir('/home/iot/workspace/Emulator/qiling-dev/vivetok')
    if len(sys.argv) > 2 and sys.argv[1] == "-t":
        main(sys.argv[2], trace=True)
    else:
        main(sys.argv[1])

• ql.hook_address(callback=start_afl, address=0x180F8)：在执行到0x180F8这个位置时调用start_afl函数
• ql.run(begin=0x180F8)：从0x180F8开始执行
• ql_afl_fuzz：就是unicornafl提供的fuzz接口uc_afl_fuzz_custom的一个wrapper
• place_input_callback：ql_afl_fuzz会调用的回调函数，负责写入fuzz数据

Fuzz buf

根据网上的漏洞分析比对源码框架，利用:

cho -en "POST /cgi-bin/admin/upgrade.cgi HTTP/1.0nContent-Length:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGGGGHHHHIIIIXXXXnrnrn"  | nc -v ::1 9080

可以触发漏洞，具体位于框架中http头部解析函数：read_header，位于httpd中17F80位置

那么该如何fuzz呢，根据网上unicorn-afl官方用例和qiling官方用例：buf-fuzz，即定位代码中读取数据位置，然后读取完后劫持搜索特定字符串定位fuzz的buff_addr，当然需要状态保存(当然这个方法肯定不是很严谨，因此后面还会介绍劫持read函数方法)

import os, sys, struct
from socket import AF_INET
sys.path.append('/home/iot/workspace/Emulator/qiling-dev')
from qiling import Qiling
from qiling.const import QL_INTERCEPT, QL_VERBOSE
from qiling.os.const import STRING
from unicorn.unicorn import UcError
"""
struct hostent{
    char *h_name;  //official name
    char **h_aliases;  //alias list
    int  h_addrtype;  //host address type
    int  h_length;  //address lenght
    char **h_addr_list;  //address list
}
"""
def hook_memSpace(ql: Qiling):
    ql.mem.map(0x1000, 0x1000, info='my_hook')
    data = struct.pack('<IIIII', 0x1100, 0x1100, AF_INET, 4, 0x1100)
    ql.mem.write(0x1000, data)
    ql.mem.write(0x1100, b'qiling')

def lib_gethostbyname(ql: Qiling):
    args = ql.os.resolve_fcall_params({'name':STRING})
    print('[gethostbyname]: ' + args['name'])
    ql.arch.regs.write('r0', 0x1000)


def saver(ql: Qiling):
    print('[!] Hit Saver 0x%X'%(ql.arch.regs.arch_pc))
    ql.save(cpu_context=False, snapshot='./context.bin')
    print(ql.mem.search(b'fuck'))


#[read(5,  0x4edca,  0x2000)] locate buf
def read_syscall(ql: Qiling, fd: int, buf: int, size: int, *args) -> None:
    print(f'[read({fd}, {buf: #x}, {size: #x})]')

def boa_run(path: list, rootfs: str, profile: str = 'default'):
    ql = Qiling(path, rootfs, profile=profile, verbose=QL_VERBOSE.OFF, multithread=False)
    """setup files"""
    ql.add_fs_mapper('/dev/null', '/dev/null')

    """set ram"""
    hook_memSpace(ql)

    """hooks"""
    ql.os.set_api('gethostbyname', lib_gethostbyname, QL_INTERCEPT.CALL)
    ql.os.set_syscall('read', read_syscall, QL_INTERCEPT.ENTER)

    """setup saver"""
    ql.hook_address(saver, 0x0180FC)        #read finish

    ql.run()

if __name__ == '__main__':
    os.chdir('/home/iot/workspace/Emulator/qiling-dev/vivetok')
    path = ['./rootfs/usr/sbin/httpd', "-c", "/etc/conf.d/boa", "-d"]
    rootfs = './rootfs'
    profile = './boa_arm.ql'
    boa_run(path=path, rootfs=rootfs, profile=profile)

然后使用poc触发就行

import os, sys, struct
import capstone as Cs
sys.path.append('/home/iot/workspace/Emulator/qiling-dev')
from qiling.const import QL_INTERCEPT, QL_VERBOSE
from qiling import Qiling
from qiling.extensions.afl import ql_afl_fuzz


def simple_diassembler(ql: Qiling, address: int, size: int, md: Cs) -> None:
    buf = ql.mem.read(address, size)

    for insn in md.disasm(buf, address):
        ql.log.debug(f':: {insn.address:#x} : {insn.mnemonic:24s} {insn.op_str}')

def main(input_file: str, trace: bool = False):
    ql = Qiling(['./rootfs/usr/sbin/httpd', "-c", "/etc/conf.d/boa", "-d"], rootfs='./rootfs', profile='./boa_arm.ql', verbose=QL_VERBOSE.OFF, console = True if trace else False)
    ql.restore(snapshot='./context.bin')

    fuzz_mem = ql.mem.search(b'fuck')

    target_addr = fuzz_mem[0]

    def place_input_callback(_ql: Qiling, input: bytes, _):
        # print(b"**************** " + input)
        _ql.mem.write(target_addr, input)


    def start_afl(_ql: Qiling):
        """
        Callback from inside
        """
        ql_afl_fuzz(_ql, input_file=input_file, place_input_callback=place_input_callback, exits=[0x018398])

    ql.hook_address(callback=start_afl, address=0x0180FC+4)
    # ql.hook_code(simple_diassembler, begin=0x0180FC, end=0x018600, user_data=ql.arch.disassembler)

    try:
        # ql.debugger = True
        ql.run(begin=0x0180FC+4, end=0x018600)    #注意arm函数返回地址比较奇怪，不一定在函数末尾
        os._exit(0)
    except:
        if trace:
            print("\nFuzzer Went Shit")
        os._exit(0)  

if __name__ == "__main__":
    if len(sys.argv) == 1:
        raise ValueError("No input file provided.")

    os.chdir('/home/iot/workspace/Emulator/qiling-dev/vivetok')
    if len(sys.argv) > 2 and sys.argv[1] == "-t":
        main(sys.argv[2], trace=True)
    else:
        main(sys.argv[1])

这里很坑的一点是，在漏洞中因为Content-Length成员不以\n结尾时就会让v31等于0会让strncpy报错但是不一定是pc指针错误，而是某些指令地址操作数问题

v30 = strstr(haystack, "Content-Length");
v31 = strchr(v30, '\n');
v32 = strchr(v30, ':');
strncpy(dest, v32 + 1, v31 - (v32 + 1));

在源码中AFL模块调用以下函数完成fuzz执行：

def _dummy_fuzz_callback(_ql: "Qiling"):
            if isinstance(_ql.arch, QlArchARM):
                pc = _ql.arch.effective_pc
            else:
                pc = _ql.arch.regs.arch_pc
            try:
                _ql.uc.emu_start(pc, 0, 0, 0)
            except UcError as e:
                os.abort()              #添加部分
                return e.errno

因此添加os.abort通知AFL程序崩溃

Fuzz sys_read

上面直接对buf写入Fuzz数据肯定不是一个很理想的办法(比如Fuzz数据超出读取长度)，当然人家给的例子就是这么Fuzz的也不失一种方法；之后

就尝试利用Qiling的系统调用劫持功能让Fuzz效果更好。

从read函数调用处开始执行，在这之前劫持read函数调用让程序直接读取文件输入：

def read_syscall(ql: Qiling, fd: int, buf: int, size: int, *args) -> int:
    # print(fd, buf, size)
    data = ql.os.stdin.read(size)
    # print(data)
    ql.mem.write(buf, data)
    return len(data)

def place_input_callback(_ql: Qiling, input: bytes, _):
    # print(b"**************** " + input)
    ql.os.stdin.write(input)

    return True


def start_afl(_ql: Qiling):
    """
    Callback from inside
    """
    ql_afl_fuzz(_ql, input_file=input_file, place_input_callback=place_input_callback, exits=[0x018398])

同样写个脚本把服务并且设置debugger等待gdb连接：

然后将crash中的数据发送：

也确实触发到了漏洞：

0x900a5d74 in strncpy () from target:/lib/libc.so.0
gef?  backtrace 
#0  0x900a5d74 in strncpy () from target:/lib/libc.so.0
#1  0x0001853c in ?? ()
Backtrace stopped: previous frame identical to this frame (corrupt stack?)
gef?  

fuzz过程中不好调试连写的harness有没有效果都不知道，可以使用capstone同步解析执行汇编情况：

def simple_diassembler(ql: Qiling, address: int, size: int, md: Cs) -> None:
    buf = ql.mem.read(address, size)

    for insn in md.disasm(buf, address):
        ql.log.debug(f':: {insn.address:#x} : {insn.mnemonic:24s} {insn.op_str}')

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