Finnish PM and President announce historic move

Finland’s decision to begin the process of joining NATO is a huge moment of change for Europe, and a moment of maturity for the left. The move is not only led by the social-democratic prime minister, Sanna Marin, but has seen Li Andersson, the leader of the radical left, overcome opposition within her own party.

Finland will be a major asset to NATO, and a major contributor. With a population of less than six million, and a thousand kilometre border with Russia, its active defence forces include just 21,000 people. However, with a 900,000 strong trained reserve force, based on the conscription system, it is capable of mobilising 280,000 trained and equipped troops in wartime.

Traditionally its geopolitical stance has been armed neutrality, a position that large numbers of Finnish voters have rapidly abandoned in response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine.

That has put Andersson’s Vasemmistoliitto (Left Alliance) in a bind. It is a part of the social-democratic led coalition, after taking a historic decision to join government after scoring 8.2% in the 2019 election.

Last weekend the party’s council decided that it would not leave the coalition if the country decides to join NATO, reversing a previous stance. When the country’s security committee published its pro-NATO opinion yesterday, the only dissenting member was an oppositionist from Vasemmistoliitto.

Left Alliance leader and Finnish education minister Li Andersson

Today Andersson has published a blog outlining her position on the NATO move. It’s not just interesting for observers of the debate within the 18 parties of the European Left, between an overtly pro-Kremlin minority, a pacifist faction and a pro-Ukriane wing. It illustrates the way all European politicians of the left are being forced to frame the hard choices imposed by Russia’s invasion.

Andersson writes (via Google translate, sorry):

“According to the latest opinion polls, a clear majority of Left Alliance voters are now in favor of NATO membership. On the other hand, there are still many for whom opposing a military alliance is an important part of their ideology and who do not see that an alliance would increase Finland’s security”.

Andersson describes the sea-change of opinion among young, left, pacifist inclined Finns.

“Many of us have thought that Putin’s Russia, despite its aggressive rhetoric, lobbying, and human rights concerns, would not have embarked on a large-scale war in another independent country. This could have been expected, especially knowing what hostilities mean to Russia with the severance of sanctions and the breakdown of Western relations. We were wrong.”

From this fundamental change flows Andersson’s proposed position. She criticises the rushed way in which the decision is being taken, and the vitriolic way opponents of NATO membership have been accused of aiding the enemy.

Failure of alternatives

The essential debate for Finland, she says, is whether NATO membership enhances security or increases risk. This, in a way, is an echo of Olaf Scholz public wrestling with the same problem over arms supplies to Ukraine.

So for Andersson, the biggest issue is not whether to join NATO, but whether Finland can restrain NATO — and the Russian Federation — from blundering into a war in which her country would surely be on the front line.

She is self-critical of the left tradition for its past refusal to support defence alliances short of NATO: for example a Nordic Defence League (involving Norway), or a Defence Alliance with Sweden. She says the reason Finns are turning in large numbers to the NATO option is because the left stymied these other options before.

Her own preference would have been for Finland to rely primarily on the EU, with its Article 42.7 security guarantee. She writes:

“However, the European option has been overtaken by the fact that the EU does not have existing structures or practices for common defense. A common defense exists at the time of war only if it is prepared for and practiced in peacetime.”

She points out one of the major risks:

“We do not know what direction the internal development of the United States will take in the coming years and decades. The earth is deeply divided and the polarization is not going anywhere. Trump or some other right-wing candidate could win the 2024 presidential election, which could further accelerate the dichotomy. If he or a relative were to win the presidential election, it would be unclear how strong the U.S. commitment to European security would be in the future.”

Despite this clear risk, and absent the EU as a collective security option, she appears to concede it is inevitable that Finland will join NATO. The question then, for the Finnish left, is what conditions it will place on that.

Common Nordic voice in NATO?

Technically, conditionality is impossible. The accession process involves five stages, with the question being: does Finland meet the criteria. There is no option in the text to place conditions on membership. However, Finnish security experts believe there is every chance for Finland to place limits and opt outs on its membership obligations.

In the dissenting opinion from the security committee report, the MP Markus Mustajärvi also a member of Vasemmistoliitto opposes NATO membership and calls for a referendum (there is currently no plan for one). He raises the following conditions, should Finland join: no deployment of nuclear weapons, or transit of nuclear weapons; no training Finnish pilots on the use of nukes; no permanent bases for foriegn armies; no use of Finnish territory for hostile purposes.

Andersson, in response states:

“Although I see risks in a possible decision, I am ready to accept Finland’s NATO membership, because that is the will of the Finnish people and the clear majority of the Finnish Parliament. I am prepared to accept that the option I prefer, namely European cooperation, does not offer a similar realistic solution in the current situation. We should have understood to build this option much earlier.”

Instead of opposing membership, she advocates the left pursue the following goals: that Finland can maintain its own, sovereign foreign policy; that it cannot be pressured over its willingness to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. She writes

“Equally important is the fact that Finland is pushing harder for NATO to focus more and more unequivocally on being a defense alliance and to reduce the emphasis on crisis management in the alliance’s policies.”

“If Finland and Sweden join NATO, a strong common Nordic voice is possible. That is what is needed for NATO to be developed precisely as a defense alliance and not as a military organization that uses violence to promote “peace and democracy” around the world”.

F-35A stealth fighter: Finland has ordered 64 new aircraft, to Russia’s displeasure

What it means

The Finnish Left Alliance has become one of the most influential left parties in Europe, following its decision — like Podemos Unidos in Spain— to enter a centre-left led coalition. While some on the European left have focused on “blaming NATO” and opposing arms supplies to Ukraine, Andersson’s party has had to adapt rapidly to the threat, and to the changing mood of its young, socially liberal and working class base.

Skepticism over NATO membership inside the party came not only from the orthodox Marxist left, but from a realist wing which understood that the country would become a net contributor to Baltic region defence, with a wartime army bigger than those of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Sweden put together.

For those, like me, who advocate that the left-led governments of Sweden and Finland join NATO, Andersson’s intervention is welcome. It recognises the need for the left to stay in government, despite a geostrategic change that will leave many of its older supporters dismayed.

It recognises the need for the left — if it has governmental ambitions — to play an active part in shaping NATO’s strategy, with the high-welfare societies of Europe exerting pressure against the “out of area” ambitions of US neocons, and against the desire of some to turn NATO into a global player confronting China.

As the Swedish Left Party, and indeed Swedish social-democracy now grapples with the same issues, Andersson’s intervention will be influential there, and throughout the European Left.

I hope that what comes out of this is a co-ordinated left intervention into the Madrid process, to force the debate about NATO’s future strategic priorities into the open, where all parts of civil society can play a part.