Participants view a quantum computing prototype model during the 2021 Quantum Industry Conference in Hefei, China, Sept. 18, 2021. Xinhua via Getty Images / Han Xu

China may have taken the lead in the race to practical quantum computing with a recent announcement that it has shattered a record for solving a complex problem.

In 2019, Google reported that its 53-qubit Sycamore processor had completed in 3.3 minutes a task that would have taken a traditional supercomputer at least 2.5 days. Last October, China’s 66-qubit Zuchongzhi 2 quantum processor reportedly completed the same task 1 million times faster. That processor was developed by a team of researchers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences Center for Excellence in Quantum Information and Quantum Physics, in conjunction with the Shanghai Institute of Technical Physics and the Shanghai Institute of Microsystem and Information Technology. 

Traditional supercomputers like those of the U.S. military and the People’s Liberation Army’s 56th Research Institute are used to conduct complex simulations for equipment design, process images and signals to spot targets and points of interest, and analyze oceans of data to understand hidden trends and connections. But some tasks remain time and resource intensive, for even the tiniest computing bits require time to flip between 1 and 0.

Superconducting quantum computers can bypass physical limits by creating a superposition of the 1 and 0 values. Essentially, standard computing bits must be either a 1 or a 0. But in extremely low temperatures, the physical properties of matter undergo significant changes. Superconducting quantum computers take advantage of these changes to create qubits (quantum bits), which are not limited by the processing hurdles that traditional computers face. Qubits can be both 1 or 0, simultaneously.This promises to speed up computing immensely, enabling assaults on henceforth uncrackable problems like decrypting currently unbreakable codes, pushing AI and machine learning to new heights, and designing entirely new materials, chemicals, and medicines.

The world’s scientific and military powers are spending billions of dollars in the race to turn this promise into reality. China has notched several notable advancements in recent years. In 2020, the University of Science and Technology of China, home of leading Chinese quantum computing scholar Pan Jianwei, conducted the first space-based quantum communications, using the Micius satellite to create an ultra-secure data link between two ground stations separated by more than 1,000 miles. 

In October, a Chinese team reported that its light-based Jiuzhang 2 processor could complete a task in one millisecond that a conventional computer would require 30 trillion years to finish. This breakthrough marked a new top speed for a quantum processor whose qubits are  light-based, not superconducting. The  quantum states needed for the superconducting computers to function are delicate, can be unstable, and are prone to causing large numbers of errors. However, light-based supercomputers also have their drawbacks, as it is difficult to increase the number of photons in this type of quantum computer, due to their delicate state. It remains to be seen which method will be more prevalent.

These achievements stem from Beijing’s emphasis on quantum computing research. China is reportedly investing $10 billion in the field, and says it increased national R&D spending by 7 percent last year. By contrast, the U.S. government devoted $1.2 billion to quantum computing research in 2018 under a new national strategy. Last year, the Senate passed a bill to create a Directorate of Technology and Innovation at the National Science Foundation, and add $29 billion for research into quantum computing and artificial intelligence from 2022 to 2026, but it awaits reconciliation with a similar bill passed by the House last month.

Chinese researchers, firms, and agencies now hold more patents in quantum tech than does the United States (although U.S. companies have more in the specific field of quantum computing), amid allegations that these advancements benefit from stolen U.S. work. A year ago, the Commerce Department blacklisted seven supercomputing entities for their association with the People’s Liberation Army. Further, there is evidence that the Chinese government has been stealing encrypted U.S. government and commercial data, warehousing it against the day when quantum computers can break today’s encryption.

We are still a few years away from seeing a real advent of quantum computing. Currently, most quantum computers are able to coherently operate with around 50 qubits. To realize quantum computing’s full potential in codebreaking, for example, would require qubit amounts in the thousands. But progress is being made. IBM reportedly produced a 127-qubit superconducting quantum computer in November, intends to unveil a 400-qubit processor this year, and aims to produce a 1,000-qubit processor in 2023. 

Given the enormous strategic potential of quantum computing in a wide variety of fields, this competition is set to only grow more intense in the near future. Whether the U.S. can keep pace remains to be seen. 

Thomas Corbett is a research analyst with BluePath Labs. His areas of focus include Chinese foreign relations, emerging technology, and international economics.

P.W. Singer is a strategist at New America and the author of multiple books on technology and security, including Wired for War, Ghost Fleet, Burn-In, and LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media.

A Marine simulates providing security for an amphibious landing in Appari, Philippines, March 28, 2022, during Balikatan, a bilateral exercise between the U.S. and Philippines. Marine Corps Sgt. Melanye Martinez

During the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration released an unprecedented amount of classified intelligence regarding Russian plans, even revealing insider knowledge of Vladimir Putin’s intentions. This attempt at deterrence by detection failed; Putin invaded anyway. But the quality of allied intelligence-gathering and the new National Defense Strategy point toward a potentially better way to dissuade adversaries, through what the Pentagon calls “campaigning.” 

Most discussion of the new NDS centers on its approach of Integrated Deterrence, in which all instruments of national power are orchestrated to prevent aggression. But the mixed results, at best, from the West’s combination of sanctions, intelligence revelations, and diplomacy suggests that capable, nuclear-armed adversaries like Russia and, more importantly, China may not be stopped by Integrated Deterrence’s threats of last-minute denial or punishment. 

The new defense strategy’s inclusion of campaigning as one of its three main lines of effort provides a way for the Pentagon to break from simply trying to deny or punish aggression. Drawn from Marine Corps doctrine, campaigning refers to the orchestration of military activities alongside economic, diplomatic, and information actions to achieve specific goals. Through campaigning, U.S. forces would attempt to undermine adversary attempts at coercion, complicate enemy planning, and develop U.S. warfighting capabilities. 

Campaigning may seem like another word for what the U.S. military does every day but is intended to convey a deliberate and methodical approach to cause specific results in a particular context, rather than generally support U.S. allies or deter opponents. 

Russia demonstrated a form of campaigning during the lead-up to its invasion of Ukraine and in the months thereafter. In combination with building up foreign exchange reserves to insulate the country from sanctions, Russian leaders threatened cyber attacks, energy warfare, and nuclear escalation to suppress Western retaliation. Partly in response, U.S. leaders foreswore putting boots in the ground or conducting large cyber operations to protect Ukraine. 

Another relevant example is the Cold War, when strategists devised a plan to undermine Soviet leaders’ confidence in their plans and capabilities. Rather than relying solely on forces in the Fulda Gap to stop a Warsaw Pact invasion, U.S. and allied militaries developed new capabilities like the Tomahawk missile to threaten the Soviet periphery, sent submarines to the Barents Sea to hold Soviet nuclear missile subs at risk, pursued “Star Wars” missile defenses, and fielded stealth fighters and precision-guided weapons to imperil Soviet reinforcements. 

Many of these new technologies did not reach the field before the Cold War ended, and some—like Star Wars—never achieved their ambitions. But the combination of concepts and capability development with persistent U.S. and allied forward operations arguably kept leaders in Moscow off-balance and less likely to initiate aggression.

China is in most ways a more formidable opponent than the Cold War Soviet Union or today’s Russia. If threats of denial or punishment did not stop Putin from invading Ukraine, they are even less likely to deter leaders in Beijing from attacking Taiwan. Instead, the United States and its allies will need to pursue a long-term effort at dissuasion, or an effort to reduce the likelihood of an adversary taking an undesirable action.  

Campaigning could operationalize dissuasion by creating a feedback loop between U.S. or allied actions and Chinese decision-making. U.S. military posture changes, experiments or demonstrations, exercises, and new tactics and concepts should sway Chinese leaders’ assessments of how easily the People’s Liberation Army could defeat China’s neighbors and at what cost. A well-orchestrated series of U.S. and allied actions could convince officials in Beijing to defer hostilities until they are more confident of success on acceptable terms. 

If the U.S. intelligence community’s insight into China’s internal decision-making is on par with what it demonstrated with Russia, Pentagon planners could use Chinese assessments of U.S. actions to develop and refine a dissuasion campaign over months or years. And if U.S. intelligence lacks the level of penetration it has in Russia, leaders could still rely on observable responses to build a model of Chinese decision-making that would help shape the campaign. 

However, analysis is only half the battle. Whether it depends on direct intelligence, models, or both, campaigning requires sustained action to generate surprise and create measurable responses. Persistent engagement has paid off in cyberspace for U.S. Cyber Command and in the media for Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky. The Pentagon could apply persistent engagement across other domains in a campaign against China if U.S. leaders are willing to accept a modest risk of escalation. 

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command leaders are concerned China could attempt to forcibly reunite with Taiwan during this decade. Moreover, the failure of deterrence against Russia shows threats of denial or punishment may not be credible against peer militaries fighting in their own back yards. The U.S. military should quickly launch a new approach toward preventing hostilities against allies and partners. With its emphasis on campaigning, the new defense strategy offers a path to dissuading China rather than waiting to mount a goal-line stand that is unlikely to succeed. 

During the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration released an unprecedented amount of classified intelligence regarding Russian plans, even revealing insider knowledge of Vladimir Putin’s intentions. This attempt at deterrence by detection failed; Putin invaded anyway. But the quality of allied intelligence-gathering and the new National Defense Strategy point toward a potentially better way to dissuade adversaries through what the Pentagon calls “campaigning.” 

Most discussion of the new NDS centers on its approach of Integrated Deterrence, in which all instruments of national power are orchestrated to prevent aggression. But the mixed results, at best, from the West’s combination of sanctions, intelligence revelations, and diplomacy suggests that capable, nuclear-armed adversaries like Russia and, more importantly, China may not be stopped by Integrated Deterrence’s threats of last-minute denial or punishment. 

The new defense strategy’s inclusion of campaigning as one of its three main lines of effort provides a way for the Pentagon to break from simply trying to deny or punish aggression. Drawn from Marine Corps doctrine, campaigning refers to the orchestration of military activities alongside economic, diplomatic, and information actions to achieve specific goals. Through campaigning, U.S. forces would attempt to undermine adversary attempts at coercion, complicate enemy planning, and develop U.S. warfighting capabilities. 

Campaigning may seem like another word for what the U.S. military does every day but is intended to convey a deliberate and methodical approach to cause specific results in a particular context, rather than generally support U.S. allies or deter opponents. 

Russia demonstrated a form of campaigning during the lead-up to its invasion of Ukraine and in the months thereafter. In combination with building up foreign exchange reserves to insulate the country from sanctions, Russian leaders threatened cyber attacks, energy warfare, and nuclear escalation to suppress Western retaliation. Partly in response, U.S. leaders foreswore putting boots in the ground or conducting large cyber operations to protect Ukraine. 

Another relevant example is the Cold War, when strategists devised a plan to undermine Soviet leaders’ confidence in their plans and capabilities. Rather than relying solely on forces in the Fulda Gap to stop a Warsaw Pact invasion, U.S. and allied militaries developed new capabilities like the Tomahawk missile to threaten the Soviet periphery, sent submarines to the Barents Sea to hold Soviet nuclear missile subs at risk, pursued “Star Wars” missile defenses, and fielded stealth fighters and precision-guided weapons to imperil Soviet reinforcements. 

Many of these new technologies did not reach the field before the Cold War ended, and some—like Star Wars—never achieved their ambitions. But the combination of concepts and capability development with persistent U.S. and allied forward operations arguably kept leaders in Moscow off-balance and less likely to initiate aggression.

China is in most ways a more formidable opponent than the Cold War Soviet Union or today’s Russia. If threats of denial or punishment did not stop Putin from invading Ukraine, they are even less likely to deter leaders in Beijing from attacking Taiwan. Instead, the United States and its allies will need to pursue a long-term effort at dissuasion, or an effort to reduce the likelihood of an adversary taking an undesirable action.  

Campaigning could operationalize dissuasion by creating a feedback loop between U.S. or allied actions and Chinese decision-making. U.S. military posture changes, experiments or demonstrations, exercises, and new tactics and concepts should sway Chinese leaders’ assessments of how easily the People’s Liberation Army could defeat China’s neighbors and at what cost. A well-orchestrated series of U.S. and allied actions could convince officials in Beijing to defer hostilities until they are more confident of success on acceptable terms. 

If the U.S. intelligence community’s insight into China’s internal decision-making is on par with what it demonstrated with Russia, Pentagon planners could use Chinese assessments of U.S. actions to develop and refine a dissuasion campaign over months or years. And if U.S. intelligence lacks the level of penetration it has in Russia, leaders could still rely on observable responses to build a model of Chinese decision-making that would help shape the campaign. 

However, analysis is only half the battle. Whether it depends on direct intelligence, models, or both, campaigning requires sustained action to generate surprise and create measurable responses. Persistent engagement has paid off in cyberspace for U.S. Cyber Command and in the media for Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky. The Pentagon could apply persistent engagement across other domains in a campaign against China if U.S. leaders are willing to accept a modest risk of escalation. 

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command leaders are concerned China could attempt to forcibly reunite with Taiwan during this decade. Moreover, the failure of deterrence against Russia shows threats of denial or punishment may not be credible against peer militaries fighting in their own back yards. The U.S. military should quickly launch a new approach toward preventing hostilities against allies and partners. With its emphasis on campaigning, the new defense strategy offers a path to dissuading China rather than waiting to mount a goal-line stand that is unlikely to succeed. 

Bryan Clark and Dan Patt is Senior Fellows at the Hudson Institute.