A detailed look at the S-300P anti-aircraft missile system

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Strategic Context

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Both the Almaz S-300P/S-400 (SA-10, SA-20) and Antey S-300V (SA-12) SAM systems  grew out of the disappointments of Vietnam and the Yom Kippur wars, where single digit S-75/SA-2, S-125/SA-3 and 3M9/SA-6 series SAMs were soundly defeated in combat by the US and Israelis respectively. Designed for the high density battlespace of late Cold War central Europe, the S-300P and S-300V series of SAMs represent the pinnacle of Soviet Cold War era SAM technology, with no effort spared to push the technological envelope. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, both systems have continued to evolve, benefitting immeasurably from large scale access to Western technology markets, and Western computational technology to support further design effort. Against the current benchmark in Western SAM technology, the Raytheon Patriot PAC-3 system, both the S-300P and S-300V series remain highly competitive.

5V28E / SA-5 Gammon

It should come as no surprise that the US publicly expressed concerns about the possibility of Serbia and Iraq acquiring these systems prior to the OAF and OIF air campaigns - the presence of these systems could have dramatically changed the nature of both air campaigns. With superb missile kinematics, high power-aperture phased array radar capability, high jam resistance and high mobility, the S-300P series and S-300V would have required unusually intense defence suppression effort, changing the character and duration of both air campaigns. The political fracas surrounding the Cypriot order for S-300PMU1, and the long standing intent of both North Korea and Iran to purchase large numbers of late model S-300P underscore this point.

In US terminology, the double digit S-300P series and S-300V systems represent anti-access capabilities - designed to make it unusually difficult if not impossible to project air power into defended airspace. The B-2A and F-22A were both developed with these threat systems in mind, and are still considered to be the only US systems capable of robustly defeating these weapons. The technique for defeating them is a combination of wideband all aspect stealth and highly sensitive radio-frequency ESM receivers, combined with offboard sources of near-realtime Intelligence Surveillance Reconaissance (ISR) data on system locations.

Aircraft with no stealth, reduced RCS capabilities, or limited aspect stealth, such as the F-15E, F-16C, F/A-18E/F, Eurofighter Typhoon and JSF are all presented with the reality that high to medium altitude penetration incurs a very highly risk of engagement by either of these weapon systems. It is perhaps ironic that the only reliable defence for aircraft lacking top tier all aspect stealth capability is high speed low altitude terrain masking using Terrain Following Radar, supplemented by offboard near-realtime ISR data, support jamming and standoff missiles. Australia's F-111s, if used cleverly, were arguably much more survivable against this class of technology than the vast majority of newer types in service - it should come as no surprise that the Bundes-Luftwaffe in Germany developed the terrain following Tornado ECR Wild Weasel precisely around this regime of attack on the SA-10/20/12.

That the Canberra DoD leadership opted in 2002 to wholly ignore the arrival of the S-300P series SAMs in the Asia-Pacific region, in their long term force structure planning, is nothing less than remarkable and raises some very serious questions about how well the capabilities of these systems are actually understood in the halls of the Canberra Russell Offices. Despite repeated proposals by a great many parties, there are no plans to equip the RAAF with anti-radiation missiles or support jamming aircraft, there was an ongoing drive for early F-111 retirement, and the F-22A Raptor, the US solution to the S-300P problem, is generally dismissed as being too good for Australia.

Unlike Sukhoi Su-27/30 fighters which many expect will require a robust support infrastructure, intensive training, good tactics and talented fighter pilots to operate, all taking time to mature into a viable capability, the S-300P/S-300V series SAMs were designed for austere support environments, to be operated and maintained largely by Soviet era conscripts. Therefore the integration of these weapons into wider and nearer regional force structures will not incur the delays and difficulties expected by some observers with the Sukhois. A package of S-300P/S-300V batteries could be operationally viable within months of deployment in the region, and earlier if contract Russian or Ukrainian personnel are hired to bring them online faster. The notion of fifteen years warning time looks a little absurd, given that these systems can proliferate and operationally mature as capabilities within one to two years.

With the first generation of these SAMs deployed during the early 1980s, currently marketed variants are third and fourth generation evolutions of the basic design, mature systems built with characteristic Russian robustness and simplicity where possible.

In recent years the accelerated marketing tempo of the desperate Russian industry has seen a surprisingly large amount of detailed technical material on these weapons appear in the public domain, with publications like Military Parade, Vestnik PVO, Missiles.ru and Russkaya Sila posting detailed summaries and data on Internet websites, albeit mostly accessible only to readers of Russian. Other former Warpac nations have also been surprisingly open in sharing information on these weapons. Given the availability of this data it is now possible to compile more comprehensive analyses of these weapons, than of equivalent US products such as the Patriot. This analysis is based largely upon Russian sources.

The arrival of S-300P and S-300V missile systems in the region radically changes the strategic environment, both from the perspective of the US and Australia. These highly capable systems are not invincible, but require significant investment into specialised capabilities to defeat them - prohibitive losses in aircraft and aircrew otherwise might occur. As they are less demanding to operate than modern combat aircraft, operators across the broader region will be able to achieve combat effective proficiency faster than with the Su-27/30. In practical terms the S-300P/S-300V SAMs are a viable deterrent against air forces without the technological and especially intellectual capital to tackle them - and in many respects better value for money than the Su-27/30. Their failure to sell in larger numbers reflects more than anything poor marketing by Russia's industry.

The US Air Force's approach to defeating these SAMs is conceptually simple: the F-22A exploiting its all aspect wideband stealth, supercruise, high altitude and sensitive ESM warning capability will kill the engagement and acquisition radars using guided weapons., primarily the GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb. High power standoff support jamming was to have been provided by the cancelled program for B-52H aircraft equipped with electronically steerable high power jamming pods,  standoff ISR support will be provided by systems such as the RC-135V/W, E-8C and since cancelled E-10 MC2A. Standoff or highly stealthy ISR capabilities will be necessary - the current generation of high altitude UAVs like the RQ-1B and RQ-4A /B are not survivable in airspace covered by the S-300P/S-300V systems.

Conventional unstealthy, or partially stealthy combat aircraft will have difficulty surviving within the coverage of the S-300P/S-300V systems - the high transmit power, large radar and missile seeker apertures, low sidelobes, generous use of monopulse angle tracking and extensive ECCM features make these systems difficult to jam effectively. Self protection jammers will need to produce relatively high X-band power output, and exploit monopulse angle tracking deception techniques - Digital RF Memory techniques with high signal fidelity are nearly essential. Even so the challenges in defeating these systems with a self protection jammer are not trivial - raw power-aperture does matter in this game.

In practical terms, low level terrain masking to remain below the radar horizon of these systems, combined with good standoff ISR, support jamming and a low radar signature standoff missile, is the only reliable defence for an aircraft with anything greater than insect sized all aspect radar signature. For instance the JSF's forward sector stealth is likely to be adequate, but its aft and beam sector stealth performance will not be, especially considering the wavelengths of many of the radars in question - a JSF driver runs a real risk of taking a 3,000 lb hypersonic SAM up his tailpipe if he cannot kill the target SAM engagement radar in his first pass. For the JSF, integration of a terrain following radar mode in its AESA radar is not an unusual technical challenge, incurring only modest development cost. The bigger bite will be in shortened airframe fatigue life resulting from fast low level penetration with a modestly swept wing design.

Of the current crop of conventional fighters in Western service, the most survivable are those with good TFRs - the F-111, Tornado and F-15E if fitted with the LANTIRN TFR pod - all requiring a high performance EW suite.

A weakness of both the S-300P/S-300V systems is that they are severely radar horizon limited in a fully mobile configuration. The addition of mast mounted acquisition radars to extend their low level footprint severely impairs the mobility of the battery.

The popular idea of shooting cruise missiles, anti-radiation missiles or standoff missiles at the S-300P/S-300V battery, assuming its location is known, is only viable where such a weapon has a sufficiently low radar signature to penetrate inside the minimum engagement range of the SAM before being detected - anything less will see the inbound missile killed by a self defensive SAM shot. The current Russian view of this is to sell Tor M2E/SA-15D Gauntlet and Pantsir S1/S2 / SA-22 self-propelled point defence SAM systems as a rapid reaction close in defensive Counter-PGM system to protect the S-300P/S-300V battery by shooting down the incoming missile if it gets past the S-300P/S-300V SAMs. Integration of the new Fakel 9M96 series point defence SAM would provide an organic Counter-PGM defensive capability in the battery.

In summary, current RAAF force structure plans do not provide for a robust long term capability to defeat the S-300P/S-300V class of SAMs - weapons which are very likely to be encountered during coalition operations, and most likely, regional operations over the coming two or more decades. If the RAAF wishes to remain competitive in this developing regional environment, further intellectual and material investment will be needed.

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Almaz S-300P/PT Volkhov-M6 / SA-10A Grumble A

Зенитный Ракетный  Комплекс  С-300П/ПT

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The earliest origins of the S-300P series lie in the mid 1960s, when the Soviet Voyska PVO and Ministry of Military Production initiated its development. The aim was to produce an area defence SAM system capable of replacing the largely ineffective S-75/SA-2 Guideline and S-200/SA-5 Gammon systems, neither of which performed well against low flying Wild Weasels, low RCS targets or US support jamming aircraft. The original intent was to design a common SAM system for the Voyska-PVO (Air Defence Forces), Voenno-Morskiy Flot (Navy) and the PVO-SV (Air Defence Corps of the Red Army) but divergent service needs across these three users soon saw commonality drop well below 50%. Ultimately the V-PVO's S-300P series and PVO-SV's S-300V series diverged so completely to become largely unique systems.

The design aims of the original S-300P were to produce a strategic area defence SAM system, intended to protect fixed targets such as government precincts, industrial facilities, command posts and headquarters, military bases, strategic and tactical airfields and nuclear sites. This weapon system was to initially defeat SAC's SRAM firing FB-111As, B-52Hs and then anticipated B-1As, and later the Boeing AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile. The deployment model of the first generation systems was based on the existing S-75/SA-2, S-125/SA-3 and S-200/SA-5 systems, with a semi-mobile package of towed trailer mounted radars and missile Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL).

5P85-1 TEL (Author)

The S-300P introduced some important technological innovations. The first generation V-500/5V55 missile used a single stage solid rocket motor, and conceptually is closest to the baseline US Army MIM-104 Patriot. The missile was deployed and handled in a sealed cylindrical launch tube/canister, with a cold start gas generator used to eject the missile vertically before its motor was initiated. The 5P85 TEL was a semi-trailer arrangement, with the forward booms splayed when deployed as stabilisers. The four launch tubes were mounted on a hydraulically elevated frame, retained in later TEL designs. A typical battery would be equipped with three 5P85 TELs, each with four SAMs, or double the SAM complement of the S-75/SA-2 it replaced and permitting 2 rounds per launch. The designation of this TEL following a mid life block upgrade became 5P85-1.

5N63 Flap Lid A Engagement Radar (радиолокатор подсвета и наведения)

The first generation of the S-300P's 5N63 (later 30N6) Flap Lid A engagement/fire control radar was also innovative, and clearly influenced by the Raytheon MPQ-53 engagement radar for the MIM-104 Patriot. The Flap Lid, like the MPQ-53, uses a 10,000 element transmissive passive shifter technology phased array, with a space (a.k.a. optical) feed into the rear plane of the antenna, using a microwave lens feed and a complex monopulse horn arrangement. The Flap Lid's antenna stows flat on the roof of the radar cabin, which was initially deployed on a trailer towed by a Ural-357, KrAZ-255 or KrAZ-260 6x6 tractor. The whole radar cabin is mounted on a turntable and used to slew the phased array to cover a 60 degree sector of interest.

MPQ-53 Patriot

The 5N63 was a huge generational leap in technology from the Fan Song, Low Blow and Square Pair mechanically steered and scanned engagement radars on preceding V-PVO SAMs. With electronic beam steering, very low sidelobes and a narrow pencil beam mainlobe, the 30N6 phased array is more difficult to detect and track by an aircraft's warning receiver when not directly painted by the radar, and vastly more difficult to jam. While it may have detectable backlobes, these are likely to be hard to detect from the forward sector of the radar. As most anti-radiation missiles rely on sidelobes to home in, the choice of engagement geometry is critical in attempting to kill a Flap Lid.

Unlike the Patriot's MPQ-53 engagement radar which has substantial autonomous search capability, the 5N63  is primarily an engagement radar designed to track targets and guide missiles to impact using a command link channel. The absence of dedicated directional antennas on this system indicates that the commands are transmitted via a specialised waveform emitted by the main array. The first generation of the 5V55K missile was command link guided, following the design philosophy of the S-75/SA-2 and S-125/SA-3, with a cited range of 25 nautical miles and altitude limits between 80 ft and 80,000 ft.

S-300PT 5P85-1 TEL

This variant was designated the S-300PT (P - PVO, T -Transportiruyemiy) and incrementally upgraded models the S-300PT-1, it entered service in 1978. NATO labelled it the SA-10A Grumble.

36D6/ST-68UM/5N59 Tin Shield (РАДИОЛОКАЦИОННАЯ СТАНЦИЯ)

Two search and acquisition radars were introduced to support the S-300PT, both with 360 degree coverage. The 3D 36D6/ST-68UM/5N59 Tin Shield was used for high and medium altitude targets, and the 2D 76N6 Clam Shell for low altitude low RCS targets.

36D6 Tin Shield

The 36D6 Tin Shield is semimobile and towed by a KrAZ-255 or -260 tractor, it can be deployed or stowed in one hour, or two with the mast. The design uses a large paraboloid cylindrical section primary reflector and a linear element array deployed on a pair of booms to provide electronic beam steering in elevation from -20 to +30 degrees, the antenna can perform a full 360 degree sweep in 5 to 10 seconds. With a transmitter peak power rating cited between 1.23 MegaWatts and 350 kiloWatts, the manufacturer claims the ability to detect a 0.1 square metre RCS target at 300 ft AGL out to 24.8 nautical miles, and at medium to high altitudes to 94.5 nautical miles. Clutter rejection is claimed to exceed 48 dB, and the system can track 100 targets. An IFF system is integrated in the radar.

LEMZ 5N66/5N66M/76N6 Clam Shell (низковысотный обнаружитель)

Its sibling, the 5N66/5N66M/76N6 Clam Shell low level early warning radar, is an unconventional frequency modulated continuous wave design, using a split antenna arrangement with a large beak to prevent spillover from the transmitter. Quoted performance figures include the detection of targets with an RCS as low as 0.02 square metres, at speeds of up to 1,400 kt, with a bearing resolution of 1 degree, velocity resolution of 9.3 kt and range resolution of 2.15 NM. Quoted RMS tracking errors are 0.3 degree in bearing, 4.7 kt in velocity and 1 NM in range. Chaff rejection performance is quoted at better than 100 dB, detection range is stated to be 50 NM for targets at 1,500 ft altitude, and 65 NM for 3,000 ft altitude. The transmitter delivers 1.4 kW of CW power at an unspecified carrier frequency, system MTBF is quoted at 100 hr with an MTTR of 0.5 hr.

76N6 Clam Shell Technical Analysis [Click for more ....]

5N66M / 76N6 / 40V6M

40V6M Chassis Deployed

5N66M / 76N6 / 40V6MD - this is the extended height mast variant.

An important feature of the S-300PT was the introduction of the semi-mobile 40V6, 40V6M and 40V6MD masts, towed by a MAZ-543 derived tractor, in turn based on the 1966 Scud launcher vehicle. The 23.8 metre tall 40V6, 40V6M could be used to elevate the Clam Shell, Tin Shield and Flap Lid radars to extend their radar horizon and improve clearance in uneven terrain. The double height 37.8 metre tall 40V6MD has been used with the Flap Lid, Clam Shell,  and its recent 96L6 replacement. The masts take 1 to 2 hours to erect. The unique 40V6 series masts permit static or semimobile S-300P series SAM systems extended low level coverage not available in any competing Western designs, and were clearly introduced to defeat SAC's low level FB-111A, B-52G/H and B-1B force - and the AGM-86B cruise missile. These masts continue to be marketed as an accessory for the latest production variants of S-300P radars.

The Tin Shield / Clam Shell / Flap Lid combo provided the V-PVO with the first all altitude acquisition and engagement package on a semi-mobile SAM system and was a key factor driving the development of the F-117A and B-2A bombers. Had the balloon gone up in 1984, the F-117A would have tasked first and foremost with obliterating the V-PVO's S-300P radar systems.

54K6 Mobile Command Post 

The two radars were integrated with a 5N63S mobile command post, carried on an 8x8 MAZ-7910 chassis.